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ABSTRACT: 
Understanding that the battles of World War II were not limited to combat operations, but 
also included a war of words, the United States Government engaged in domestic and 
foreign propaganda campaigns. This essay traces the steps taken to establish these 
propaganda efforts during World War II through two main sources of electronic media: 
Hollywood and the Voice of America. This discussion also includes an examination of 
the relationship between propaganda and democracy. 
INTRODUCTION: 
In an effort to increase support for World War II among American soldiers and civilians, 
the U.S. government called upon Hollywood to use its theatrics to sell the war. The 
Hollywood film industry transformed the silver screen into a battlefield went to war with 
the production of Frank Capra's Why We Fight series, and "the B's," short, low budget 
films like Rosie the Riveter with war themes and heroes. The U.S. government also felt 
the needed to spread its ideals and war aims to foreign countries. 1939, America was the 
only world power without a government-sponsored international radio new service. In 
February 1942, John Houseman inaugurated The Voice of America to serve the need for 
war-torn and closed areas to hear news about America and America's war effort. VOA 
had many struggles both technical and in trying to find purpose and stability, especially 
in the post-war years. In both the domestic and foreign arenas, propagandists struggled 
with how a democracy can use propaganda without diminishing its ideals. 
PURPOSE STATEMENT: 
I intend to show how the electronic media was used to promote America's war aims on 
the home front and overseas during World War II. I have chosen the Hollywood film 
industry and the Voice of America to define propaganda, and to discuss why propaganda 
was needed, why these mediums were chosen, how effective the propaganda campaigns 
proved to be, and how propaganda can exist in a democracy. 
A War of Words: America's Domestic and Foreign Propaganda Efforts in World War n 
The principle battleground of this war is not in the South Pacific. It is not the Middle 
East. It is not England; or Norway, or the Russian Steppes. It is American opinion. 1 
World War II is appropriately called a world war because it took place in all 
comers of the earth. Men fought and died on islands in the South Pacific, on the beaches 
ofNonnandy, in forests of Europe, in remote towns in the Far East, and in the deserts of 
Africa. War took place in the air, on the ground, on the water, and even below the water. 
But the battles of World War II cannot be restricted to combat; much of the battles fought 
during the war took place across radio airwaves and on the silver screen. These battles 
did not directly bring about casualties, although some messages would eventually justify 
the genocide of millions, but instead changed and motivated peoples' hearts and minds to 
believe in the importance of the war effort. 
American propaganda theorist Harold Lasswell once said, "Not bombs nor bread, 
but words, pictures, songs, parades and many other similar devices are the typical means 
of making propaganda." The art of political persuasion, or what Lasswell defined as "the 
control of opinion by significant symbols," has existed since the beginning of time. But 
modem democracies and the mass media transfonned it from a minor activity to an 
instrument oftotal warfare.2 Understanding this inevitable "war of words," the United 
States Government engaged in both domestic and foreign propaganda campaigns. 
Despite some initial doubts, President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew that his administration 
not only had to bolster morale at home, but also combat foreign propaganda.3 
With increases in technology and power, the electronic media was one of several 
mediums used to promote America's war aims. Hollywood could deliver messages to the 
home front via the silver screen, and to make America's voice heard throughout the rest 
of the world the U.S. government inaugurated a foreign radio service called the Voice of 
America. Through these two vehicles, American patriotism could be both seen and heard 
throughout the war torn world. 
The Domestic Propaganda Effort 
Americans needed an answer to the question of why we were fighting in a war 
thousands of miles away. As Oliver Cromwell declared, "Give me the man who knows 
that for which he fights, and loves that which he knows.'.4 Few citizens were willing to 
blindly follow authority across an ocean and into battle. In 1916, 1.7 million Americans 
were in high school; in 1940, 7.1 million. In 1916,400,000 attended college; in 1940, 1.4 
million. Roosevelt's fireside chats assumed educated Americans who wanted 
explanations for citizen obligations. Acceptance of state policy, everyone seemed to 
agree, demanded some reason why. Not necessarily the whole truth, mind you, but at 
least plausible justification. 5 
It was important for both American troops and civilians to believe in the war 
effort. Six months after the United States entered World War II, the federal government 
launched a major propaganda program to assist in fighting the war. The dominant agency 
in the propaganda campaign was the Office of War Information (OWl), established by 
executive order in June of 1942. The purpose of the OWl was to communicate American 
aims in the war and to convey to domestic and foreign audiences the ideals that could 
bring about a peaceful and democratic post-war feeling.6 
Movies provided an obvious way of informing the public about American aims in 
World War II. Each week, approximately eighty million Americans attended one of the 
sixteen thousand theatres throughout the country. Soon after the Japanese attack on 
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Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt called the motion picture "one of our most effective 
media in informing and entertaining our citizens" and said that the motion picture 
industry could make "a very useful contribution" to the whole war effort.7 "Movies 
could clarify complex problems for people who were less inclined to read newspapers 
and other written materials, and the seductive qualities of the screen could help generate 
the support the nation needed." 8 
Roosevelt promised to reduce government censorship and asked for the 
continuous release of movies that would keep the public abreast of the war. The OWl's 
Bureau of Motion Pictures was given the job of ''watchdog'' over Hollywood film 
production. The OWl issued numerous guidelines to ensure conformity in the films. The 
motion picture industry followed the OWl's regulations, producing films in a standard 
format. The results were an effective combination of information, patriotism, hero-
worship, and propaganda. Other messages hammered away at similar themes. Military 
strength, home front sacrifices, ethnic harmony, underground resistance, individual 
heroism, and Allied cooperation all flickered on the screen, and attested to the total 
victory motif.9 
The military's domestic propaganda efforts existed on two major levels: 
motivating the troops to believe in the cause of war, and, as a result, perform well in 
battle, and secondly, educating American civilians about the aims ofthe war. If those on 
the home front believed in the war effort, they would encourage their soldiers and 
increase production of wartime necessities. Hollywood was able to aid in the war effort 
by producing motivational documentaries, like Frank Capra's Why We Fight series and 
fictional productions like the B's, to entertain and persuade both soldiers and civilians to 
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the cause of war. One thing is for certain; "no other period in cinematic history equaled 
the output of propaganda films produced during the Second World War. Hollywood's 
efforts contributed to the nation's morale by capitalizing on America's love affair with 
the movies."l0 
The state of mind of soldiers was of special concern to General George C. 
Marshall, President Roosevelt's trusted Chief of Staff. The willingness of the men to 
accept the army regimen, their enthusiasm, and their ability to carry out their assignments 
were the product of a complex of attitudes subsumed under the term morale. ll A Morale 
branch was created and began the task of educating soldiers with orientation lectures. 
The lectures were not effective. As Major Edward L. Munson of the Morale branch 
wrote in July of 1941, "There is every indication that the bulk of our soldiers have no real 
knowledge of why they are in training.,,12 Munson recommended that a variety of 
propaganda mediums be tested, and urged that the Morale Branch solicit the help of the 
motion picture industry. Munson described the situation as a "morale emergency" and 
recommended that not only the recruits, but also the civilian popUlation be educated and 
motivated. l3 
Why We Fight 
In 1942, Marshall took Munson's advice and called upon Frank Capra to produce 
a documentary film series called Why We Fight. The series became the basis for the 
army orientation course, and the first film, Prelude to War, was shown as part of regular 
movie presentations throughout the country. David Culbert praised the series as "the 
most comprehensive set of war aims released by the United States government in any 
medium during World War II.l4 
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To many, Capra did not seem the likely choice for the job; he had never produced 
a documentary. Marshall was attracted to the patriotic nature of some of Capra's recent 
films like Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, which "suggested Capra's inclination and 
capacity to use film to convey simple truths to mass audiences.,,15 
A statement made by Italian-born Capra also revealed his interest in pursuing the 
Why We Fight project: "An evil man like Hitler could reach fifteen million people for 
twenty minutes, but a movie director like me could communicate with hundreds of 
millions for two hours. I was wasting my God-given talents, making me an offense not to 
God, but to humanity.,,16 
To prepare for his project, Capra decided to check out his competition, namely 
Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will, a product of Nazi propaganda. Triumph of the 
Will used powerful symbols, editing, and music to depict Hitler as a national savior. 
Triumph of the Will had convinced military leaders and filmmakers all over the world 
how powerful and persuasive a film could be for propaganda. Its distribution to remote 
parts of Germany showed that film could unify an entire population. 17 
Capra was shocked by the power of Triumph of the Will and made two decisions. 
First, he would use footage from this film to condemn the mob psychology. Secondly, 
Capra believed his series would surpass Reifenstahl's accomplishments. IS Capra was 
determined that Why We Fight would: "shock, cajole, flatter, and uplift America; using 
every gimmick in Hollywood's sales kit, it would blend the dark necessity of military 
service into a theatrical epiC. 19 
Capra's knowledge of the industry allowed him to get the best cutters, 
screenwriters, and directors in Hollywood. Capra also had the best animators. The staff 
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at the Disney Studio proved to be the best in the business with "the most brilliant 
. d . ffi' 1 film ,,20 anImate maps ever to appear m 0 ICla I S. 
The first film, Prelude to War, begins with the question of why Americans are 
being called to war. The answer given was not based on Nazi aggression in Europe or the 
Japanese attack, but the deeper issue of the fight between the free world and the slave 
world. The film forced Americans to see that individual and national problems were, and 
always would be, dependent upon the problems of the whole world. 21 
In October 1942, Capra finished work on Prelude and showed the film to his 
superiors. President Roosevelt was "thrilled" by the film and enthusiastic over its 
propaganda potentia1.22 The next step was getting theatres to show the fifty-five minute 
film. One advertisement depicted a soldier with the plea, "He gave a lifetime. Mister, 
can you spare 55 minutes of screen time?,,23 
Six other films in the Why We Fight series followed, including: The Nazi's Strike 
(1943), Divide and Conquer (1943), The Battle a/Britain (1943), The Battle a/Russia 
(1944), The Battle a/China (1944), and War Comes to America (1943). 
Shown to both soldiers and civilians, the Why We Fight series was a major 
Hollywood contribution to the American propaganda efforts. Capra's decision to use the 
enemy's acts, books, speeches, films, and newsreels was an act of "stunning 
simplicity.,,24 As David Culbert describes, The Why We Fight films defmed American 
war objectives to military and civilian audiences throughout the world in a way 
Roosevelt's Four Freedoms never could. It is the medium of film, which provides the 
most comprehensive statement of war aims produced in America between 1941 and 
1945.25 
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TheB's 
Less dramatic than the Why We Fight series, but equally important as a part of 
Hollywood's contribution to the propaganda efforts were the B's. B's were low-grade, 
low budget supporting films that were a little more than sixty minutes long. The name B 
comes from the low-budget aspect of the film. By 1935, more than seventy-five percent 
of America's cinemas ran double bills consisting of the major feature, supplemented with 
newsreels, cartoons, and a B.26 Every major studio had its own B-section, and by 1941, 
hundreds of B-movies flickered on the silver screen. When Pearl Harbor shook 
Americans from their complacency about the war, the B-industry went to work turning 
out title after title, touching upon the national emergency. No subject, issue, person, or 
1 · . d 27 ocatlOn was omltte . 
The best-known B-musical was Rosie the Riveter, a film that "idealized the distaff 
factory assemblers who worked long hours turning out military aircraft in noisy defense 
plants.,,28 The protagonist was an All-American girl who postponed her marriage 
"because Uncle Sam needed everyone to pitch in and fight the Axis.,,29 Her fiance ended 
up joining the army, and the two agreed to wed only after the last place left the assembly 
line. Rosie was awarded a prestigious certificate from a United States Senator as a 
chorus sang: "There's Something True About Red, White, and Blue.,,3o 
The B-title Rosie the Riveter became a popular catchword on the home front. 
Many women, regardless of their wartime occupations, became known as Rosies. While 
the GI's fought the war, the Rosies kept the factories rolling, producing important 
supplies. The B hit proved to be an effective propaganda tool: almost every family sent at 
least one female member to work on the assembly line.31 
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The B-productions played an integral role in the overall Hollywood film 
propaganda of World War II. The amount of B's produced, and the enormous crowds 
that viewed them, allowed the same messages to be hammered into the minds of 
Americans: "spies were everywhere, so watch out; Uncle Sam needed workers, do your 
part; find ajob in a defense plant; and the Axis enemies, when confronted on the foreign 
battlefield by the American GI, always capitulated to the Red, White, and Blue.,,32 
There is debate over the effectiveness of Hollywood's propaganda efforts during 
World War II. The films satisfied home front viewers about Allied victories and kept 
military and civilian morale high, but many times they over simplified issues, distorted 
the truth and presented fiction as fact. One GI, fed up with Hollywood's propaganda, 
sent a letter to Time magazine in 1944 calling the war time movies "idiotic hoopla.,,33 
The GI criticized the perfect superman appearance of the soldier who, with "well-
manicured bare hands, killed 180 Japanese soldiers.,,34 
Evidence of Prelude to War's effect on audiences is less than dramatic. Ironically, 
no scientific sample could show that a will to win had been instilled solely through these 
films?5 "Understanding of the threat posed by totalitarian nations to 'our way oflife' 
varied only four percent between those who had not seen it and those who had.,,36 
In 1945, Dorothy B. Jones, head ofthe Reviewing and Analysis section of the 
Hollywood office of OWl, personally screened or read 1300 features released from 1942 
through 1944. She concluded that "out of the 1300 features only 50 aided significantly, 
both at home and abroad, in increasing understanding of the conflict. ,,37 This means only 
four percent of the film output made a contribution, according to her standards. 
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Much of the criticism aimed at Hollywood is probably misguided and should be 
directed toward propaganda efforts in general. Hollywood was criticized for 
oversimplifying issues, presenting only one side of a message, neglecting important 
aspects of an event or issue, and repeating the same simple themes over and over. 
Hollywood is guilty of doing all of those things, but that is essentially the nature of 
propaganda. For most movie-goers on the home front, the Hollywood motion picture 
industry provided the encouragement needed to sustain morale during the country's 
somber days of defeat, and when the tide turned, glorified the many battles that brought 
the armed forces closer to V -J Day. Many components contributed to the Allied final 
victory in August 1945 and the propaganda films ranked high on the list. 38 
Through documentary films, like Capra's Why We Fight and the vast number of 
B-productions like Rosie the Riveter, Hollywood played its role in the propaganda efforts 
of World War II. Hollywood took the war from far off battlefields and brought it home 
to theatres in towns and cities across the United States. Hollywood was able to entertain, 
but at the same time raise consciousness and motivate people to care about the war effort. 
Hollywood's battlefield was the silver screen. Its directors were generals; its actors were 
soldiers; its cameras were weapons; and its scripts were attack plans. Hollywood was 
able to assist the military by winning the hearts and minds of the American public during 
World War II. 
The Foreign Propaganda Effort 
But winning American hearts and minds was not the only concern of the military. 
To be successful in its propaganda campaign, American war ideals needed not only to be 
seen by Americans, but also heard by foreign audiences. America had to get a consistent 
and powerful message across to the world: "Americans were sympathetic, even 
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sentimental, according to a 1942 directive. They combined an idealistic aspiration 
towards Utopia with a shrewd, hard, horse sense ... They are slow to anger, but, once 
aroused, they finish what they start. ,,39 Director of the Office of War Information Elmer 
Davis said the basic message was "that we are coming, that we are going to win, and that 
in the long run everybody will be better off because we won.,,40 
During the years between the two world wars, the fear of propaganda, which had 
been initiated by massive persuasion campaigns by both Allies and the Central powers 
during World War I, increased with the successful fascist movements of the 1930s.41 
International radio propaganda had developed in Europe and Asia during the 1930s and 
by September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, every major power except the 
United States had its own foreign broadcasting service. Americans were shocked at the 
success of the German army's military and propaganda strengths. By the end of the 
1930s German radio was on the air over twenty-one hours a day, working to divide, 
confuse and fragment the world.42 The French had been protected by the Maginot Line 
and by as strong an army as existed in the West: yet France had collapsed within weeks 
of the German assault. Many believed that France had fallen because the French will to 
resist had been undermined by Nazi propaganda. "It had been a battle won by words in 
which the first, and crucial blow had come by airwaves. ,,43 
At the beginning of the war, most of the country, including President Roosevelt, 
rejected propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy, but those feelings subsided with 
an increase in fear of Nazi propaganda. In late 1940, Roosevelt appointed a special 
committee to study the issue. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson warned the committee 
that the Germans were undermining the American institutions of freedom of press and 
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freedom of discussion, and that the nation would have to fight back. Other advisors told 
the committee that "the country should mobilize for propaganda warfare just as much as 
it needed to for ground and air warfare. ,,44 Liberal playwright and presidential speech 
writer, Robert E. Sherwood proclaimed that "America had to fight Nazi propaganda with 
American propaganda. ,,45 
Following the Battle of Britain, President Roosevelt became more convinced. He 
called for the establishment of an executive agency with the responsibility of overseas 
intelligence and foreign propaganda. In July 1941, William J. Donovan was appointed 
Coordinator oflnfonnation (COl) and almost immediately asked Sherwood to serve as 
director of international propaganda. Sherwood agreed and chose short-wave radio as 
America's primary medium for oversees propaganda. 
Radio was ready made for propaganda. Roosevelt himself had proved the power 
of radio with his fireside chats. Before the chats, only one White House employee was 
necessary to handle all the presidential mail. Following the first fireside chat unanswered 
letters piled up in Roosevelt's White House. Through radio, Roosevelt had established an 
almost personal relationship with the American electorate.46 
The invention of short- wave broadcasting in the early 1920s had expanded the 
potential of broadcasting. Short-waves bounce like stones skipping across water and 
strike the earth in regular intervals. This skipping effect allowed short wave radio to be 
heard over a longer distance and across international boundaries.47 
Radio was the best way to actually reach Europeans. Leaflets could be dropped, 
but risking planes and lives on non-military operations was not appealing to the Royal 
Air Force. It was difficult to plant newspaper stories in Nazi-occupied Europe and 
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impossible to show films or hang up posters. Radio had the power to go behind enemy 
lines and reach directly into peoples' homes.48 Radio can reach the masses, but can also 
achieve the intimacy ofa conversation.49 With government censorship of newspapers and 
curfews that kept them at home, most Europeans relied entirely on radio to get their war 
information.5o Radio soon became the fourth fighting arm ofthe war. 
Radio did have its problems. Sherwood was not permitted to create an overseas 
radio broadcasting station. As with the Hollywood propaganda efforts, an established 
industry played a large part in working out arrangements for borrowed transmission. 
Roosevelt felt strongly that borrowing, rather than creating its own station would keep the 
good graces of the private radio industry. Sherwood was left to rely on existing short 
wave outlets, and the radio industry was reluctant to cooperate. Initial radio programs 
suffered from both physical and atmospheric interference. Relying on the BBC to 
transmit its programs, American messages were subject to censorship by the British who 
wanted to conform the messages to British propaganda goals. Even the direct short wave 
broadcasts were subject to atmospheric interference and poor reception.51 
Voice of America is Born 
Pearl Harbor transformed the situation. It gave Sherwood the emergency and 
heightened public awareness he needed to convince the president to create a station with 
foreign service as its primary operation. On February 24, 1942 a new government radio 
station called the Voice of America was born. William Harlan Hale opened the first 
VOA broadcast with the words, "The Voice of America speaks. Today, America has 
been at war for 79 days. Daily at this time, we shall speak to you about America and the 
war--the news may be good or bad---we shall tell you the truth. ,,52 A well-known radio, 
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theatre and film producer John Houseman was its first director and was for foreign 
propaganda what Frank Capra was for domestic. Like Roosevelt, Houseman had first 
hand experience with the power of radio; he had joined Orson Welles in producing The 
War of the Worlds, a radio broadcast of a fictional invasion form Mars that did not seem 
fictional to the listeners who fled their homes in fear. Once adequate resources were 
available, the Yankee Doodle signature of the Voice of America was heard in all comers 
ofthe globe. 53 
By 1942, the Voice of America broadcast from New York to Europe twenty-four 
hours a day, seven days a week in twenty-seven languages. News formed the backbone 
of the Voice's efforts. Sherwood decided early in the war to avoid the emotional appeals 
on the assumption that the people abroad, deafened by years of enemy propaganda, 
would respond best to a presentation of the facts of war. He also believed "that all U.S. 
information to the world should be considered as though it were a continuous speech by 
the president." Spot news made up much of the output, but it was supplemented by 
feature stories and interpretive pieces that helped place events in the framework of the 
war. 54 
Houseman supported the use of news, but rejected the single-voice news reporting 
of private stations and the BBC. He wanted to create a special American sound that 
would announce to the overseas listener that this was America speaking. Houseman was 
not a product of the world ofjoumalism, and so in developing his style he relied upon his 
knowledge of radio drama, radio documentary and live political theatre. 
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To give VOA a distinct sound, each broadcast was introduced by three 
announcers: 
FIRST VOICE: This is New York, the United States of America, calling the 
people of Europe. 
SECOND VOICE: Every morning at this time you hear our voices from America 
THIRD VOICE: telling you what this country is doing and thinking towards 
winning the war.55 
Houseman also applied the use of multiple speakers to news accounts: 
FIRST VOICE: It came in communiques from Lt. General Joseph Stilwell which 
announced that American warplanes are now in full cooperation with the Chinese 
offensive. Here is that important communique: 
SECOND VOICE: American bombers and fighters attacked Japanese 
headquarters at Linchuan in Kiangski Province, dropping demolition and 
incendiary bombs while Japanese ground troops were attacking. 56 
Houseman used the style in a feature describing the severity of Nazi rule in Vichy France. 
The multiple voices projected an image of democracy, a nation of many voices working 
together to win the war: 
VOICE: Such is the law of Nazi Germany. 
VOICE: All that is forbidden is required. 
VOICE: Such is the voice Hitler wants to impose on the world. 
VOICE: All that is forbidden is required. 
VOICE: Such is the law the Vichy Kommandatur wants to impose on the French. 
VOICE: Free expression, 
VOICE: Forbidden! 
VOICE: To be a patriot, 
VOICE: Forbidden! 
VOICE: To eat enough, 
VOICE: Forbidden.57 
14 
Houseman wanted this dialogue to tell the ordinary person that she or he could take 
action that would affect the course of events. Through its style, VOA urged its audience 
to take their fate into their own hands and resist Axis powers. 58 
Not everyone loved Houseman's style. A British commentator once called 
VOA's tone rather like "selling Colgate toothpaste, urgently.,,59 The OWl was also 
disapproving of Houseman's approach to propaganda. Congress did not dismantle VOA, 
but did express discontent with the station's liberal political position and radical thirties 
tone, and Louis Cowan replaced Houseman as director ofVOA. By 1943, it had become 
clear that the Allies were going to be successful; increasing numbers of allied victories 
made the war its own best salesman. American propagandists turned to a low key, 
informational propaganda in the broadcasting style of network news. A new political 
viewpoint called for a new artistic vision.60 
Post-War Propaganda 
American propaganda matured during World War II, and with the maturity came 
a more realistic assessment of what propaganda might do. In the end, the radio and film 
campaigns of OWl played a useful part in the struggle, but always in conjunction with a 
host of other weapons that were equally, ifnot more, important.61 
The end ofthe war also raised difficult questions about what kind of goals the 
American government hoped to achieve in post-war propaganda and what sort of agency 
should survive the war. In 1945, the State Department had not yet created a plan. In 
contrast from other countries, America's international broadcasting was established 
purely as a wartime expedient, with no peacetime experience to fall back on once the war 
ended. Many Americans were not prepared to allow propaganda, which they regarded as 
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only a wartime necessity, to impinge upon foreign diplomacy in times of peace. 62 Three 
possibilities emerged for organizing information after the war ended. First, a government 
information service could operate within the State Department. Second, an independent 
agency, similar to the OWl, might be formed. Third, the private sector could shoulder 
the burden, with each company supporting its own efforts and working in loose 
coordination with the government.63 
The Voice of America did not end in 1945 but rather was transferred, along with 
other activities of the Overseas Branch, to the State Department. There it remained for 
the next few years, "badly staffed and demoralized, a shell of its former self, going 
through the motions without well-defined political goals" to guide it. 64 The United States 
remained unwilling to support a serious international broadcasting station until 1947, 
when "the cold war defined a new enemy and infused the Voice with new meaning and 
new energy. ,,65 
Propaganda v. Democracy 
America remained in a constant struggle on the ethics of using propaganda, both 
at home and abroad. As one writer stated, "a democratic government is completely 
precluded, by its own principles, from all use of propaganda, understood in the sense of 
the authoritative installation of one view to the exclusion ofothers.66 The OWl had a 
number of potentially conflicting goals. It was to provide truthful information to the 
American public, and meanwhile to develop campaigns, like those on behalf of bond 
buying or factory output, to secure certain actions by that public. At the same time it was 
to provide truthful information to overseas audiences, but that material had to be slanted 
for the purposes of propaganda. 67 
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In dictatorships it was much easier for a government to speak with one voice. In 
Germany propaganda had long been centralized under the direction of Joseph Goebbles. 
The message that emerged was inflated, exaggerated, and distorted in the interests of 
achieving victory. Japan's message was also controlled; victories were hailed and defeats 
hidden from the public eye. In the Soviet Union propaganda had long supported the 
goals of Soviet policy. The greatest struggle came in the nature of the American belief in 
the war itself. Propaganda used to promote democracy in the hopeful, idealistic terms of 
the early founders of OWl seemed out of place in a war that policy makers claimed they 
were "fighting for the purposes of military victory alone. ,,68 
War has often made the lines between right and wrong a bit blurry. Certainly 
Capra and Houseman did not see their actions as unethical. And what harm could be 
caused by Rosie or simple news coverage from the war front? To win war of words, the 
U.S. called upon all of its resources, from the silver screen to the radio airwaves to 
provide a positive voice of America and voice in America. The U.S. was willing to 
compromise whenever it felt it might bring a speedy end to hostilities, even when the 
compromises seemed to call into question the very reasons for going to war.69 
It was/rom the air that America had dropped the atomic bombs that ended World War II. 
It was by air that America had sustained its hold on West Berlin during the darkest 
moment of the Cold War. It was through the air that the Voice of America subverted the 
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